Bidding markets with financial constraints by Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel
 http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Beker, Pablo and Hernando-Veciana, Angel (2013) Bidding markets with financial 
constraints. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, Department of 
Economics. (Warwick economics research papers series (TWERPS)). 
Permanent WRAP url: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56602  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-
profit purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and 
full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original 
metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here is a working paper or pre-print that may be later published 
elsewhere.  If a published version is known of, the above WRAP url will contain details 
on finding it. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: publications@warwick.ac.uk  
  
Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints 
 
Pablo Beker and Angel Hernando-Veciana 
 
No 1017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints∗
Pablo F. Beker†
University of Warwick
A´ngel Hernando-Veciana‡
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
January 24, 2013
Abstract
We develop a model of bidding markets with financial constraints a la Che and
Gale (1998b) in which two firms optimally choose their budgets. First, we provide an
alternative explanation for the dispersion of markups and “money left on the table”
across procurement auctions. Interestingly, this explanation does not hinge on signif-
icant private information but on diﬀerences, both endogenous and exogenous, in the
availability of financial resources. Second, we explain why the empirical analysis of
the size of markups may be biased downwards or upwards with a bias positively cor-
related with the availability of financial resources when the researcher assumes that
the data are generated by the standard auction model. Third, we show that large
concentration and persistent asymmetries in market shares together with occasional
leadership reversals can arise as a consequence of the firms internal financial decisions
even in the absence of exogenous shocks.
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1 Introduction
Bidding markets are those in which trade is organized through bidding. The most com-
monly cited example is public procurement which amounts to between 10% and 20% of
GDP in OECD countries. Other examples include procurement in the private sector and
auctions both in the private and the public sector.1
The standard model of bidding implicitly assumes that the size of the projects is
relatively small compared to the financial resources of the firms. Unfortunately, the current
financial crisis has made evident that this assumption is not realistic for many bidding
markets:
“Oﬀers submitted on Monday by Global Infrastructure Partners and a con-
sortium led by Manchester Airport Group have been depressed [...] by the
problems of raising the necessary bank finance.”
Ferrovial receives depressed bids for Gatwick, Financial Times, 28/Apr/2009
Che and Gale (1998b) show that the predictions of the standard model do not extend to
the model where firms are financially constrained. The extent to which a firm is financially
constrained in their model depends on its budget, working capital hereafter, which they
assume to be exogenous. In reality, however, the firm’s working capital is not exogenous
but chosen out of the firm’s internal financial resources, the cash hereafter, which in turn
depends on the past performance of the firm. This paper shows how introducing this
feature can help us understand diﬀerent aspects of bidding markets.
First, we provide a new explanation for the dispersion of markups and “money left
on the table”2 across auctions observed in procurement. Interestingly, this explanation
does not hinge on significant private information about working capitals and costs, but
on diﬀerences in the availability of financial resources across auctions in a sense that we
formalize later. This casts doubts about the usual interpretation for the dispersion of
markups and “money left on the table” observed in procurement as indicative of incom-
1A detailed description of bidding markets and a wide range of examples can be found in Klemperer
(2005), OECD (2006), OFT (2007) and Einav and Levin (2010).
2Money left on the table, also known as bid spreads, is defined as the diﬀerence between the lowest and
the second lowest bids in first price procurement auctions.
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plete information and large heterogeneity in production cost.3 Second, we explain why
the empirical analysis of the size of markups may be biased downwards or upwards with
a bias positively correlated with the availability of financial resources when the researcher
assumes that the data are generated by the standard model. Third, we show that large
concentration and persistent asymmetries in market shares together with occasional lead-
ership reversals can arise as a consequence of the firms internal financial decisions even in
the absence of exogenous shocks.4 This eﬀect is greater for larger projects than for smaller
projects, a prediction in line with the empirical evidence.5
Our model also provides a formal framework to analyze the conventional wisdom in
economics that “auctions [still] work well if raising cash for bids is easy” (Aghion, Hart,
and Moore (1992, p. 527))6 as the standard model arises when the firms’ working capitals
are suﬃciently abundant. Surprisingly, in our model firms keep little working capital in
the long run, even when its opportunity cost is arbitrary low.
We are interested in markets in which only bids that have secured financing can be
submitted, i.e. are acceptable.7 For instance, this is the case of markets in which surety
bonds are required.8 We also follow Che and Gale’s (1998b) insight that the set of ac-
3Indeed, as Weber (1981) pointed out:“ Some authors have cited the substantial uncertainty concerning
the extractable resources present on a tract, as a factor which makes large bid spreads [i.e. money left on
the table] unavoidable.” More recently, Krasnokutskaya (2011) noted that “The magnitude of the money
left on the table variable [...] indicates that cost uncertainty may be substantial.“
4Exogenous shocks give rise to similar predictions when they introduce randomness in the processes
of either capacity accumulation, see Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), or learning by doing, see Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010). See also the discussion in page 6.
5Porter and Zona (1993) explain that “the market for large jobs [in procurement of highway mainte-
nance] was highly concentrated. Only 22 firms submitted bids on jobs over $1 million. On the 25 largest
jobs, 45 percent of the 76 bids were submitted by the four largest firms.”
6This conjecture has been recently questioned by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) under the
assumption that firms finance their bids by borrowing in a competitive financial market.
7Alternatively, we could have assumed that it was costly for the firm to submit a bid and not complying,
e.g. the firm may bear a direct cost in case of default.
8In the U.S., the Miller Act regulates the provision of surety bonds for federal construction projects.
State legislatures have enacted ”Little Miller Acts” that establish similar requirements for state contracts.
A surety bond plays two roles: first, it certifies that the proposed bid is not jeopardized by the technological
and financial conditions of the firm, and second, it insures against the losses in case of non-compliance.
Indeed, the Surety Information Oﬃce highlights that “the surety [...] may require a financial statement
[that] [...] helps the surety company evaluate the working capital and overall financial condition of the
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ceptable bids increases with the working capital. This feature is present in a number of
settings in which firms have limited access to external financial resources. One example is
an auction in which the price must be paid upfront, and hence the maximum acceptable
bid increases with the firm’s working capital. Another example is a procurement contest in
which the firm must be able to finance the diﬀerence between its working capital and the
cost of production. Because of this financing needs, the less the firm’s working capital is,
the larger its minimum acceptable bid must be if the external funds that are available to
the firm increase with its bid or its profitability. The latter property arises when the spon-
sor pays in advance a fraction of the price,9 a feature of the common practice of progress
payments, or when the amount banks are willing to lend depends on the profitability of
the project as it is usually the case.10
A representative example of the institutional details of the bidding markets we are
interested in is highway maintenance procurement. As Hong and Shum (2002) pointed
out “many of the contractors in these auctions bid on many contracts overtime, and likely
derive a large part of their revenues from doing contract work for the state.” Besides,
Porter and Zona (1993) explain that “The set of firms submitting bids on large projects
was small and fairly stable[...] There may have been significant barriers to entry, and there
was little entry in a growing market.”11
Motivated by these observations, we build a static model to explain our first two
main results and a dynamic model to give a broader perspective on the first result and
to explain the third one. In the static model, two firms endowed with some cash choose
working capitals to compete in a first price auction for a procurement contract. We assume
that the cost of complying is known and identical across firms, the minimum acceptable
bid increases with the firm’s working capital and only cash is publicly observable.12 Since
company.” See http://www.sio.org/html/Obtain.html#Financial and Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk (2004).
9A numerical illustration can be found in Beker and Hernando-Veciana (2011).
10We show in Appendix B that this is also the theoretical prediction of a model inspired by the observation
of Tirole (2006), page 114, that “The borrower must [...] keep a suﬃcient stake in the outcome of the
project in order to have an incentive not to waste the money.”
11Moreover, it can be shown that in a model with many firms and entry the natural extension of the
equilibrium we study has the feature that only the two firms with more cash enter the market.
12The part of our first main result regarding markups and the third main results also hold in a version
of our model with observable working capital, see Beker and Hernando-Veciana (2011).
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using cash as working capital means postponing consumption, it is costly,13 though all
our results still hold true when that cost is arbitrarily low. Firms choose their working
capitals and bids optimally. The dynamic model consists of the infinite repetition of the
static model. The cash at the beginning of each period is equal to the last period unspent
working capital plus the earnings in previous procurement contract and some exogenous
cash-flow.
In our static model, to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the
bid acceptable is strictly dominated because working capital is costly. Thus, the firm that
carries more working capital wins the contract14 and both firms incur in the cost of their
working capital, i.e. the game verifies the all pay auction structure.
The strategic considerations that shape the equilibrium working capitals are the same
as in the all pay auction with complete information.15 Not surprisingly, in a version of
our game with unlimited cash, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which firms
randomize in a bounded interval with an atomless distribution. This is also the unique
equilibrium in our game when the firms’ cash is larger than the upper bound of the support
of the equilibrium randomization. We call the scenario symmetric if this is the case, and
laggard-leader otherwise. In this latter case, firms also randomize in a bounded interval,
though the firm with less cash, the laggard hereafter, puts an atom at zero and the other
firm, the leader, at the laggard’s cash.
Our first two main results arise in the laggard-leader scenario. The dispersion of
markups and “money left on the table” is due to heterogeneity across auctions in the
availability of financial resources, i.e. either the firms’ cash or the minimum acceptable
13Any other motivation for the cost of working capital would deliver similar results.
14This feature seems realistic in many procurement contracts:
It is thought that Siemens’ superior financial firepower was a significant factor in it beating
Canada’s Bombardier to preferred bidder status on Thameslink.
Minister blocks Boris Johnson’s plan to fund 1bn Crossrail project, The Guardian, 11/Dec/2011.
15In particular, it resembles Che and Gale’s (1998a) model of an all pay auction with caps in that working
capitals are bounded by cash. Our model is more general in that they assume exogenous caps that are
common to all agents. Another diﬀerence is that in our dynamic model the size of the prize varies with
the rival’s action. To the best of our knowledge, the literature on all pay auctions, see Kaplan, Luski, Sela,
and Wettstein (2002) and Siegel (2009), has only considered the case of prizes that vary with the agent’s
action.
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bids. Either of these two variables aﬀect the equilibrium working capitals which determine
the bids, and hence the markups and “money left on the table”. Biases in the structural
estimation of the size of markups can also arise if, as it is often the case, the econometrician
does not observe costs. Imagine bid data from several auctions with identical financial
conditions and suppose the data are generated by our model. On the one had, if the
laggards have little cash, there is little money left on the table and large markups. However,
a researcher that assumed the standard model would conclude that there is little cost
heterogeneity and, as a consequence, small markups, i.e. the estimation would be biased
downwards. On the other hand, if the laggards have relatively large cash, though not too
large, there is sizable “money left on the table” and relatively low markups. However,
a researcher that assumed the standard model would conclude that there is large cost
heterogeneity and, as a consequence, large markups, i.e. the estimation would be biased
upwards.
In our dynamic model, we consider the unique equilibrium that is the limit of the
sequence of equilibria of models with an increasing number of periods.16 Remarkably, the
marginal continuation value of cash is equal to its marginal consumption value under a
mild assumption about the minimum acceptable bid. Consequently, increasing the working
capital while keeping constant the bid is suboptimal, as in the static model. One can also
argue that firms do not carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the
bid acceptable and that the all pay auction structure arises.
On the equilibrium path, the frequency of each scenario depends on the severity
of the financial constraint. We say that the financial constraint is tight (resp. loose)
when the working capital that renders financial constraints irrelevant for bidding is large
(resp. small) relative to the exogenous cash flow. The laggard-leader scenario occurs most
of the time, as the cost of working capital becomes negligible, when the financial constraint
is suﬃciently tight. Another consequence is that the same firm tends to win consecutive
procurement contracts.17 On the contrary, firms win each contract with the same proba-
16The uniqueness result is proved in the supplementary material.
17To the extend that joint profits are larger in the laggard-leader scenario than in the symmetric scenario,
our result is related to the literature on increasing dominance due to eﬃciency eﬀects (see Budd, Harris, and
Vickers (1993), Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Athey and Schmutzler (2001).) The novelty of our model
is that the underlying static game displays neither strategic complementarity nor strategic substitutability.
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bility when the financial constraints are so loose that the symmetric scenario occurs every
period. This explains our prediction of greater market concentration and asymmetric mar-
ket shares, together with occasional leadership reversals, for larger projects to the extend
that one can associate the tightness of the financial constraint to the project’s size.18
Che and Gale (1998b) and Zheng (2001) already showed that the dispersion of markups
can reflect heterogeneity of working capital if this is assumed to be suﬃciently scarce.19
We show that scarcity is the typical situation once we allow firms to choose their working
capital. Note, however, that whereas they assume that the distribution of working capitals
is the same across firms, our results show that this is seldom the case. This diﬀerence is
important because the lack of asymmetries in the distribution of working capitals precludes
the possibility of large expected money left on the table when private information is small.
In Galenianos and Kircher (2008)’s model of monetary policy, firms also choose working
capital before competing in an auction. In their equilibrium firms also randomize their
working capital due to the all pay auction structure. However, since their working capital
is not bounded by cash, the laggard-leader scenario does not arise.
Our paper contributes to the dynamic oligopoly literature “an area where much work
needs to be done and much work can be done,” as emphasized by Cabral (2012). In his
terminology our model is a properly defined dynamic oligopoly model since cash acts as a
”physical” link across periods. In particular, it contributes to a recent literature that ex-
plains how asymmetries in market shares arise and persist in otherwise symmetric models.
In particular, Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), and Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and
Satterthwaite (2010) show that firm-specific shocks can give rise to a dynamic of market
shares similar to ours. The diﬀerence, though, is that the dynamic in our model arises
because firms randomize their working capital due to the all pay auction structure.
Our characterization of the dynamics resembles that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
(1993) in that we study a Markov process in which two persistent scenarios occur infinitely
18As we do in Appendix B.
19Che and Gale (1996, 2000), DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2005) also studied the eﬀect of some given financial constraints in auctions and Pitchik
and Schotter (1988), Maskin (2000), Benoit and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2009) how bidders distribute
a fixed budget in a sequence of auctions. The latter is not a concern in our setup because the profits are
realized before the beginning of the next auction.
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often and we ask which of the two occurs most of the time as the randomness vanishes.
We want to underscore that while the transition function of their stochastic process is
exogenous, ours stems from the equilibrium strategies of the infinite horizon game. As in
Cabral (2011), a typical time series of market shares displays not only a lot of concentration
but also, and more importantly, tipping, i.e. the system is very persistent but moves across
extremely asymmetric states.
Other explanations for the persistency of markups are asymmetric information (i.e. the
standard model), capacity constraints and collusion. Our model is empirically distinguish-
able from these models in that it predicts negative correlation between the laggard’s cash
and the bids (or the price). An alternative to distinguish our model from the standard
model and the model of capacity constraints when the laggard’s cash is not observable
by the econometrician is to use as a proxy either the progress payments of the firms un-
completed contracts20 or past bids.21 These proxies do not explain the current bids in
the standard model once one controls by costs or in the models of capacity constraints
once one controls by backlog and costs, see Bajari and Ye (2003) and Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2003).
Another way in which our model is empirically distinguishable from the models of
collusion is that the time average of the price may decrease with patience22 and winning
today increases the probability of winning tomorrow. Collusive models predict that pa-
tience increases the time average of the price, see Green and Porter (1984) and Athey
and Bagwell (2001), and that winning today has either no eﬀect on winning tomorrow,
see Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), or decreases its probability, see McAfee and
McMillan (1992), Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Aoyagi (2003).
Section 2 defines our canonical model of procurement with financial constraints. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the static model and Section 4 the dynamic model. Section 5 concludes. We
also include an appendix with the more technical proofs (Appendix A) and an extension
of our model to endogenize financial constraints (Appendix B).
20The California Department of Trasnportation makes this information available in
http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/asc/oap/payments/public/ctnums.htm
21The latter holds true because the laggard’s past and current cash are positively correlated.
22This is what happens when the financial constraint is suﬃciently loose.
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2 A Reduced Form Model of Procurement with Financial
Constraints
In this section, we describe a model of procurement that we later embed in the models
of Sections 3 and 4. In this model, two firms23 compete for a procurement contract of
common and known cost c in a first price auction: each firm submits a bid, and the firm
who submits the lower bid gets the contract at a price equal to its bid.24 We assume that
firms can only submit bids that have secured financing, i.e. acceptable bids. We assume
that the minimum acceptable bid strictly decreases with the firm’s working capital w and
we denote it by π(w) + c.25 We assume π to be continuously diﬀerentiable.
As we discuss in the Introduction, our assumption that firms can only submit accept-
able bids captures a wide range of institutional arrangements whose aim is to preclude
firms from submitting bids that they cannot comply, and in particular bids that cannot
be financed.26 Alternatively, the sponsor may provide incentives to guarantee that firms
only submit bids they can comply with, for instance, by making them bear some of the
costs of default. The monotonicity of the set of acceptable bids arises naturally in markets
in which firms have limited access to external financial resources, as we discussed in the
Introduction and as we illustrate in Appendix B.
We call the markup to the diﬀerence between the winning bid and the cost of the
procurement contract c relative to this cost, and money left on the table to the absolute
23As in all pay auctions, see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996), assuming more than two firms rises
the problem of multiplicity of equilibria. It may be shown that there is always an equilibrium in which two
firms play the strategies we propose below for our two-firm model and the other firms choose zero working
capital.
24A sale auction of a good with common and known value V can be easily encompassed in our analysis
assuming that c = −V < 0 and bids are negative numbers.
25Thus, the model of auctions with budget constraints analyzed by Che and Gale (1998b) in Section 3.2
corresponds in our framework with π(w) = V − w and the interpretation of our model as a sale auction,
see Footnote 24.
26For instance, Meaney (2012) says that:
As well as considering the financial aspects of bids, the DfT[the sponsor] assesses the
deliverability and quality of the bidders proposals so as to be confident that the successful
bidder is able to deliver on the commitments made in the bidding process.
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value of the diﬀerence between the two bids relative to the cost of the procurement contract
c. We say that the firm is financially constrained if its working capital is such that only
bids strictly above the cost of the procurement contract are acceptable. We denote by θ the
working capital that renders financial constraints irrelevant for bidding, i.e. θ = π(0)−1,
and we assume that θ ∈ (0,∞).
3 A Static Model
Firms start with some cash. We assume the firm’s cash to be publicly observable. Each
firm chooses simultaneously and independently how much of its cash to keep as working
capital and an acceptable bid for a market as described in Section 2.
The firm maximizes the payments to the shareholders, its consumption hereafter, plus
the discounted sum, at rate β < 1, of the working capital and the profits. Hence, a unit
increase in working capital is costly in the sense that it reduces the current utility in one
unit and increases the future utility in β. Throughout this paper, we say that the cost of
working capital becomes negligible when β tends to 1.
We restrict to the case in which both firms start with diﬀerent cash27 and call leader
to the firm that starts with more cash and laggard to the other firm. We assume that in
case of a tie, the leader wins.28
We start by simplifying the strategy space. First, to carry more working capital than
strictly necessary to make the bid acceptable is strictly dominated, in particular a bid b
and a working capital w such that b > π(w)+c is strictly dominated by the same bid b and
a working capital w˜ such that b = π(w˜)+c.29 Next, zero working capital strictly dominates
any working capital strictly larger than the working capital νβ for which the discounted
procurement profits associated to the minimum acceptable bid βπ(νβ) are equal to the
27We endogenize the firms’ cash in the model of next section and show that our interest in the case in
which both firms start with diﬀerent cash is motivated in that it holds almost surely along the equilibrium
path because of the mixed strategies firms use every period.
28As it is usually the case in Bertrand games and all pay auctions, we deviate from the more natural
uniformly random tie-breaking rule to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. In our game, it applies
the usual conjecture that a suﬃciently fine discretization of the action space would overcome the existence
problem and yield the same results but at the cost of a more cumbersome notation.
29The firm wins in the same occasions but saves on the cost of working capital.
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implicit costs associated to postponing consumption (1− β)νβ.
The game after the elimination of strictly dominated strategies verifies the all pay
auction structure in the sense that the strategy space is unidimensional, i.e. each firm
chooses a working capital and the corresponding minimum acceptable bid, and that the
firm with higher working capital wins the procurement contract but carrying working
capital is costly for both firms. As it is usually the case in all pay auctions, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium. This can be easily understood when both firms’ cash is weakly
larger than νβ. If both firms choose diﬀerent working capitals, the one with more working
capital has a strictly profitable deviation: to decrease marginally its working capital.30 If
both firms choose the same working capital w, there is also a strictly profitable deviation:
to increase marginally its working capital if w < νβ, and to choose zero working capital if
w = νβ.31
The usual indiﬀerence condition that holds in a mixed strategy equilibrium is verified
in the margin if firms randomize with a cumulative distribution F˜ (w) that solves the
diﬀerential equation,
1− β = F˜ ￿(w)βπ(w) + F˜ (w)βπ￿(w). (1)
This is because F˜ ￿(w) equalizes the marginal cost of increasing working capital around w
with its marginal revenue. The former is equal to 1− β and the latter is equal to the sum
of a positive and a negative eﬀect. The positive eﬀect F˜ ￿(w)βπ(w) arises because the firm
moves from losing to winning the procurement contract when the rival chooses a working
capital close to w. The negative eﬀect F˜ (w)βπ￿(w) arises because when the firm wins it
makes lower profits.
We distinguish two scenarios depending on the amount of laggard’s cash. We call the
symmetric scenario to the case in which the laggard’s cash is weakly greater than νβ, and
30It saves on the cost of working capital and increases the profits from the procurement contract without
aﬀecting to the cases in which the firms wins.
31In the former case, the deviation is profitable because winning the procurement contract at w < νβ
gives strictly positive profits and the deviation breaks the tie in favor of the deviating firm with an
arbitrarily small increase in the cost of working capital and an arbitrarily small decrease in the profits
from the procurement contract. In the latter case, w = νβ implies that one of the firms is winning with
a probability strictly less one, and hence the definition of νβ means that this firms makes strictly lower
payoﬀs than with zero working capital.
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the laggard-leader scenario to the complementary case.
We call the symmetric strategy to the distribution function with support32 [0, νβ] that
verifies the diﬀerential Equation (1) with initial condition F˜ (0) = 0. This distribution is
equal to (1−β)wβπ(w) for w ∈ [0, νβ].
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium in the symmetric scenario. In this equilib-
rium both firms play the symmetric strategy.
This equilibrium verifies the usual property of all pay auctions that bidders without
competitive advantage get their outside opportunity, i.e. the payoﬀ of carrying zero work-
ing capital and losing the procurement contract.
Corollary 1. In the symmetric scenario: (i) both the laggard and the leader have the
same probability of winning the procurement contract, (ii) a marginal change in the initial
distribution of cash has no eﬀect on the equilibrium play.
Besides, one can deduce by inspection of the symmetric strategy the following corollary:
Corollary 2. In the symmetric scenario, each firm’s working capital converges33 to θ and
both the markup and the money left on the table converge to zero, as the cost of working
capital becomes negligible.
In the standard auction model (Krishna (2002), Chapter 2), the price converges to the
production cost and money left on the table vanishes as cost heterogeneity vanishes, i.e.
as the firms’ distribution of costs converges to the same value. This limit outcome also
arises in the symmetric scenario, and in this sense financial constraints become irrelevant
as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.
The above equilibrium strategy is not feasible for the laggard in the laggard-leader
scenario. We denote the laggard’s cash by ml and we call the laggard strategy to the
distribution function with support [0,ml] that verifies the diﬀerential Equation (1) and
the condition F˜ (ml) = 1. This distribution is equal to
βπ(ml)−(1−β)(ml−w)
βπ(w) for w ∈ [0,ml].
We call the leader strategy to the distribution function with support [0,ml] that verifies
32We use the definition of support of a probability measure in Stokey and Lucas (1999). According to
their definition, the support is the smallest closed set with probability one.
33In what follows, convergence is always in distribution unless stated otherwise.
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the diﬀerential Equation (1) with initial condition F˜ (0) = 0. This distribution is equal
to (1−β)wβπ(w) for w ∈ [0,ml). Note that the laggard strategy puts an atom at zero and the
leader strategy at ml.34
Proposition 2. There is a unique equilibrium in the laggard-leader scenario. In this
equilibrium, the laggard plays the laggard strategy and the leader plays the leader strategy.
Both firms put their atom of probability at points that do not upset the incentives
of the rival to play its equilibrium randomization. There is only one such point for the
laggard, whereas the leader’s atom is at the minimum working capital which ensures that
it wins the procurement contract. Interestingly, it can be shown that the laggard gets
its outside opportunity, as in the symmetric scenario, whereas the leader gets an additive
positive premium. The latter is a consequence of the leader’s ability to undercut any
acceptable bid of the laggard and the fact that any such bid is strictly profitable.
To discuss our first main result, we say that there is at most ρ uncertainty about a
random vector when there exists a realization for which both agents put probability at
least 1− ρ.35
Corollary 3. In the laggard-leader scenario: (i) the leader wins the procurement contract
with strictly greater probability than the laggard; (ii) a marginal increase in the laggard’s
cash changes the equilibrium outcome and, in particular, decreases the expected markup;
(iii) the expected “money left on the table” is at least (1−ρ)π(0)−π(ml)c and there is at most
ρ uncertainty about the working capitals if π(ml)π(0)
￿
1− (1−β)mlβπ(ml)
￿2
> 1− ρ.
Corollary 3 (i) follows from the comparison of the laggard and leader strategies, (ii)
from the fact that an increase in the laggard’s cash shifts to the right, in the sense of first
order stochastic dominance, the laggard and leader strategies. To understand (iii) note
that simple algebra shows that the left hand side of the inequality is the probability that
both firms play at their mass points, and that the “money left on the table” when both
firms play at their mass points is equal to π(0)−π(ml)c .
34Interestingly, this equilibrium has similar qualitative features as the equilibrium of an all pay auction
in which both agents have the same cap but the tie-breaking rule allocates to one of the agents only. The
latter model has been studied in an independent and simultaneous work by Szec (2010).
35A natural extension could handle continuous distributions.
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Corollary 3 (ii)-(iii) captures our first main result. Point (ii) explains why the disper-
sion of markups and “money left on the table” observed across auctions can be explained
by variations in the laggard’s cash. Note that a similar argument also applies with respect
to changes in π. Corollary 4 below shows that this result persist even as the cost of working
capital becomes negligible. Point (iii) casts doubts about the usual interpretation of the
dispersion of markups and money left on the table as indicative of incomplete information.
For instance, in the linear specification of Appendix B an application of (iii) means that
there is at most mlθ uncertainty and expected money left on the table at least
￿
1− mlθ
￿ ml
c
as the cost of working capital vanishes. Thus, a suﬃciently large θ implies almost no
uncertainty together with sizable money left on the table.
In the model of Section 4, we show by means of numerical simulations that the en-
dogenous distribution of the laggard’s cash has suﬃcient variability to generate significant
dispersion of markups and “money left on the table” across otherwise identical auctions.
Interestingly, these results are provided for parameter values for which there is little un-
certainty and the cost of working capital is small.
Corollary 4. In the laggard-leader scenario, as the cost of working capital becomes negligi-
ble, the leader’s equilibrium working capital converges to the laggard’s cash, the probability
that the leader wins the procurement contract converges to one, the markup converges to
π(ml)
c , and the expected money left on the table converges to
π(ml)
c ln
π(0)
π(ml)
.
The corollary follows by inspection of the leader and laggard strategy. Intuitively, as
the cost of working capital becomes negligible, the leader chooses its working capital to
make sure it wins with probability one, whereas the laggard’s distribution is such that the
leader does not have incentives to reduce its working capital and thus the price that it
pays.
Corollary 4 means that for β close to one, the money left on the table is increasing in
the laggard’s cash, if the latter is smaller than mˆ, and the markup is decreasing in the
laggard’s cash.36 This is the basis for our second main result. To understand why some of
the empirical analysis of the size of markups may be biased downwards or upwards with a
bias positively correlated with the laggard’s cash imagine bid data from several auctions
36Where mˆ is the unique solution to ln π(0)π(mˆ) = 1
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with identical financial conditions and suppose the data are generated by our model. On
the one hand, if the laggard has little cash there is little money left on the table and large
markups. However, a researcher that assumed the standard model would conclude that
there is little cost heterogeneity and, as a consequence, small markups, i.e. the estimation
would be biased downwards. On the other hand, if the laggard has relatively large cash,
though less than mˆ, there is sizable “money left on the table” and relatively low markups.
However, a researcher that assumed the standard model would conclude that there is
large cost heterogeneity and, as a consequence, large markups, i.e. the estimation would
be biased upwards. Note that a similar argument can also be done for appropriate shifts
in π.
4 The Dynamic Model
In this section, we endogenise the distribution of cash by assuming that it is derived
from the past market outcomes. We provide conditions under which the laggard-leader
scenario occurs most of the time. This approach provides a natural framework to study
market shares and its dynamics, and to analyze the conventional wisdom in economics
that “auctions [still] work well if raising cash for bids is easy.” We provide numerical
results that, on the one hand, complement the previous section analysis of our first main
result and, on the other hand, shed some light on the concentration and persistency of
market shares.
4.1 The Game
We consider the infinite repetition of the time structure of the game in the last section in
which the cash in the first period is exogenous and afterwards it is equal to its working
capital in the previous period plus the profits in the procurement contract and some
exogenous cash flow m > 0.37 We assume that m is constant across time and firms, and
interpret it as derived from other activities of the firm. The firm maximizes the sum
of the discounted value of its expected consumptions. Hence, in any period t in which
firms start with cash (m1t ,m2t ), choose working capitals (w1t , w2t ), and Firm 1 wins the
37Our results can be extended to the case m = 0.
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procurement contract with profits Πt, the next period distribution of cash is equal to
(m1t+1,m2t+1) = (w1t +Πt +m,w2t +m).
The following assumption is necessary in the proof of Proposition 3.
Assumption 1. w + π(w) +m ≥ θ.
Since π(w) is the minimum profit that a firm with working capital w can make when
it wins the procurement contract, this assumption implies that the firm that wins the
procurement contract one period, starts next period with cash at least θ, and hence it is
not financially constrained. As we explain after Proposition 3, this assumption guarantees
that firms do not want to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to make the
bid acceptable.
A Markov strategy consists of a working capital distribution, σ, and a bid function, b.
The working capital distribution of a firm with cash m that faces a rival with cash m￿ is a
randomization over the feasible working capitals described by its cumulative distribution
function σ ( .|m,m￿) ∈ ∆(m), where ∆(m) denotes the set of cumulative distribution
functions with support in [0,m]. The bid function of a firm with cash m and working
capital w facing a rival with cash m￿ is an acceptable bid b (w,m,m￿) ≥ c+ π (w).
We refer to the beginning of the period lifetime payoﬀ of a firm that has cash m when
its rival has m￿ as the firm’s value function and denote it by W (m,m￿).
We denote by φ(p, p￿,m,m￿) the procurement profits of a firm with cashm, and working
capital w that bids p against a rival with cash m￿(￿= m) and working capital w￿ that bids
p￿. Formally:
φ(p, p￿,m,m￿) ≡
 p− c if p < p￿ or both p = p￿ and m > m￿0 if p > p￿ or both p = p￿ and m < m￿
Definition: A (symmetric) Bidding and Investment (BI) equilibrium is a value function
W , a bidding function b and a working capital distribution σ such that for every m,m￿ ∈
R+, m ￿= m￿, W is the value function and σ ( ·|m,m￿) and b(·,m,m￿) are the optimizers of
the following Bellman equation:
max
σ˜ ∈ ∆(m)
b˜(w) ≥ π(w) + c
￿ ￿
m− w + β
￿
W˜b˜,b
￿
w,w￿,m,m￿
￿
σ
￿
dw￿
￿￿m￿,m￿￿ σ˜ (dw) ,
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where W˜b˜,b (w,w
￿,m,m￿) is equal to:
W (w +m+ φ(b˜(w), b(w￿,m,m￿),m,m￿), w￿ +m+ φ(b(w￿,m￿,m), b˜(w),m￿,m)).
Note that our equilibrium definition does not put any constraint in information sets
in which both firms have the same amount of cash. This simplifies our analysis without
upsetting our main results because in our proposed equilibrium firms do not have the
same amount of cash with positive probability neither in the equilibrium path nor after a
unilateral deviation.38
4.2 The Equilibrium Strategies
In what follows, we define a value function, a bidding function and a working capital
distribution and show that they are a BI equilibrium. The strategies we propose correspond
to a generalization of the equilibrium strategies in Section 3. The bid function is, as in
the static model, the minimum acceptable bid which is profitable, this is b∗(w,m,m￿) ≡
c+ π(w)+.39
To define the working capital distribution, we use some auxiliary functions. First, let
P be the set of continuous decreasing functions Ψˆ : R+ →
￿
0, β1−βπ(0)
￿
that verify that
Ψˆ(θ) = 0. Let x ∈ [(θ −m)+, θ] be the unique solution to 1−ββ (x−(θ−m)
+)
π(x) = 1. Lemma 2
in the Appendix characterizes the properties of the solutions to:
1− β
β
= Fˆ ￿(w)
￿
π(w) + Ψˆ(w +m)
￿
+ Fˆ (w)π￿(w), (2)
for any Ψˆ ∈ P. There is a unique solution passing by each point in [0, x] × [0, 1]. The
solution starting at (0, 0) passes by a point (νˆψˆ, 1) where νˆψˆ ∈ [νβ, x]. For any m ≥ νˆΨˆ, we
let Fˆ (·, Ψˆ,m) be a distribution function that between zero and νˆΨˆ is equal to the solution
of Equation (2) that passes by (0, 0). For any m < νˆΨˆ, we let Fˆ (·, Ψˆ,m) be a distribution
function that between zero andm is equal to the solution of Equation (2) passing by (m, 1)
and that puts the remaining probability at 0.
38We study in the supplementary material that the natural extension of our equilibrium that takes into
account these information sets in a version of our model with finitely many periods has a unique equilibrium
and it is symmetric. The equilibrium studied below corresponds to the limit of that equilibrium.
39We adopt the convention that a+ = a if a ≥ 0 and a+ = 0 otherwise.
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Consider the following functional equation:
Ψˆ(m) = βFˆ (0, Ψˆ,m)
￿
π(0) + Ψˆ(m)
￿
(3)
Lemma 3 in the Appendix applies Schauder Fixed-Point Theorem to show that this
functional equation has a solution in P that we denote by Ψβ.
Let νβ = νˆΨβ . For m ≥ νβ, let F βl,m and F βL,m be both equal to Fˆ (·,Ψβ, νβ). For
m ∈ [0, νβ), let F βl,m be equal to Fˆ (·,Ψβ,m) and let F βL,m be equal to a truncation of
Fˆ (·,Ψβ, νβ) at m with support [0,m] that puts the remaining probability at m. Our
proposed working capital distribution is defined by:
σ∗(·|m,m￿) =
 F
β
l,m(·) if m < m￿
F βL,m￿(·) if m > m￿
Let W ∗ be a value function strictly increasing in the first argument and weakly de-
creasing in the second one that verifies:
W ∗
￿
m,m￿
￿
=

m+ β1−βm if m < m
￿
m+ β1−βm+Ψ
β (m￿) if m > m￿.
(4)
Thus, Ψβ(m￿) is an additive premium associated to being leader.
Proposition 3. (W ∗,σ∗, b∗) is a BI equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proposition is based on our results in the static model. This
is because the all pay auction structure is inherited from one period to the previous one
in the following sense: if the payoﬀs of the reduced game in period t verify the all pay
auction structure, the payoﬀs of the reduced game in period t − 1 also verify it. To see
why, note that the usual property of all pay auctions that bidders without competitive
advantage get their outside opportunity implies that the laggard’s continuation payoﬀs
in period t − 1 are equal to the discounted consumption value of its cash in period t.
The leader’s continuation payoﬀs have an additive premium which is a consequence of the
leader’s ability to carry suﬃcient working capital to undercut any acceptable bid of the
laggard. This ability is independent of the amount of cash the leader has and so it is
the premium. Consequently, the value of a marginal increase in cash in period t is equal
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to its discounted consumption value plus the value of switching from laggard to leader.
Note that a marginal increase in cash switches the leadership when the cash of the firms
is the same and, by Assumption 1, no less than θ. In this case, the premium is zero by
definition of Ψβ. We can thus conclude that a unit increase in working capital, keeping
constant the bid, is costly in the sense that it reduces the current consumption in one unit
but only increases the future utility in its discounted value β. This means, as in the static
model, that it is not profitable to carry more working capital than strictly necessary to
make the bid acceptable, and that in the corresponding unidimensional simplification of
the strategy space, the firm that carries more working capital wins but carrying working
capital is costly for both firms.40
We can also distinguish here between a symmetric and a laggard-leader scenarios, and
it may be shown that an analogous version of Corollaries 1-4 holds true as well.
4.3 The Equilibrium Dynamics
To study the frequency of the symmetric and the laggard-leader scenarios, we study the
stochastic process of the laggard’s cash induced by our equilibrium.41 Its state space is
equal to [m, νβ + m] because the procurement profits are non negative and none of the
firms’ working capitals is larger than νβ. Moreover, the laggard’s cash is determined
by the equilibrium working capitals and bids in the previous period. The latter are a
function of the former which have a distribution that only depends on the laggard’s cash
in the previous period. Thus, the laggard’s cash follows a Markov process. Its transition
40Note that the property that firms do not want to carry more working capital than strictly necessary
to make the bid acceptable is also a property of the unique equilibrium of the finite version of our model.
This is because the recursive argument in the previous paragraph can be applied starting from the last
one since the last period is the same game as the static model. A formal argument is provided in the
supplementary material.
41To apply our analysis in the previous section, we restrict to information sets in which firms hold
diﬀerent amounts of cash. That is, we assume firms begin with diﬀerent amounts of cash and so it is easy
to see that the cash of the firms remain heterogeneous along the equilibrium path with probability one.
Note also that the assumption of diﬀerent initial cash holdings is without loss of generality. Indeed, it can
be shown that if firms began with identical cash, their cash holdings would become heterogeneous after
one period with probability one in any equilibrium that is the limit of the unique equilibrium of the finite
horizon version of the model that we study in the supplementary material.
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probabilities Qβ : [m, νβ + m] × B → [0, 1], for B the Borel sets of [m, νβ + m], can be
easily deduced from the equilibrium. In particular, they are defined by:42
Qβ (m, [m,x]) = 1−
￿
1− F βl,m (x−m)
￿￿
1− F βL,m (x−m)
￿
. (5)
This expression is equal to one minus the probability that both the laggard and the leader’s
working capitals are strictly larger than x−m.
A distribution µ : B → [0, 1] is invariant if it verifies:
µ (M) =
￿
Qβ (m,M)µ (dm) for all M ∈ B. (6)
Standard arguments43 can be used to show that there exists a unique invariant distri-
bution and it is globally stable. A suitable law of large numbers can be applied to show
that the fraction of the time that the Markov process spends on any set M ∈ B converges
(almost surely) to µ(M).
To characterize the frequency of the laggard-leader and the symmetric scenarios, we
distinguish two cases. We say that the financial constraint is loose when the ratio θm
is weakly less than one. Since νβ ≤ θ for any β < 1, this condition guarantees that
the symmetric scenario occurs every period. We also say that the financial constraint is
tight when the ratio θm is strictly greater than 4. This condition means that a firm that
begins a period with cash m and does not win the next three procurement contracts is
still financially constrained after three periods. We refer to the ratio θm as a measure of
the severity of the financial constraint.
Typically, the frequency of each scenario depends on a non trivial way on the transition
probabilities. An exception is when the transition probabilities do not depend on the state
which corresponds in our model to an exogenous cash flow suﬃciently large to guarantee
that only the symmetric scenario occurs, e.g. when the financial constraint is loose. In
this case, the transition probabilities do not dependent on the laggard’s current working
capital and µβ([m,x)) = 1 −
￿
1− Fˆ (x−m,Ψβ, νβ)
￿2
. A version of Corollaries 1 and 2
characterizes the properties of the equilibrium path.44 More generally, the frequency of
42As a convention, we denote by [m,m] the singleton {m}.
43See Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992).
44In the more diﬃcult case in which the transition probabilities depend on the state, the invariant distri-
bution associated to the limit transition probabilities as the cost of working capital becomes negligible has
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each scenario depends on the severity of the financial constraint as illustrated in Figure 1.
In this figure, we plot the frequency of the symmetric scenario and the frequency of what
we call the extreme laggard-leader scenario. This is when the laggard’s cash is equal to m.
Figure 1: µβ(m) and µβ ([θ, θ +m]) as a function of θm for π(x) = θ − x and β = 0.96.
Note that the sum of the probability that µβ puts on the extreme laggard-leader
scenario and on the symmetric scenario is close to one for β close to one. This is because,
as we show in Lemma 6 in the Appendix, the probability that stationary distribution puts
outside these sets tends to zero as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.
We say that the extreme laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time as the cost of
working capital becomes negligible when µβ({m})→ 1.
Theorem 1. If the financial constraint is tight and limβ→1Ψβ(m) = ∞, the extreme
laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time as the cost of working capital becomes
negligible.
Next lemma gives a suﬃcient condition for limβ→1Ψβ(m) = ∞. Interestingly, the
function π consistent with our model in Appendix B satisfies this suﬃcient condition
an easy characterization. This is because the transition probabilities become degenerate and concentrate
its probability in one point only, either m or θ+m, and thus any distribution with support in {m, θ+m}
is an invariant distribution. Since there are multiple invariant distributions, we cannot apply a continuity
argument to characterize what happens when the cost of working capital is small.
20
when the financial constraint is tight.
Lemma 1. If π(2m) + π(m) > π(0), then limβ→1Ψβ(m) =∞.
The next corollary can be derived from Theorem 1 and the property of the extreme
laggard-leader scenario, proved in Lemma 5 in the Appendix, that the laggard and the
leader play with probability one at its atom when the cost of working capital becomes
negligible.
Corollary 5. If the financial constraint is tight and limβ→1Ψβ(m) = ∞, as the cost of
working capital becomes negligible, the fraction of the time the following properties hold
converges to one (almost surely): (i) the leader wins the procurement contract; (ii) the
money left on the table is equal to π(0)−π(m)c and there is 0 uncertainty, and (iii) the
markup is equal to π(m)c .
4.4 Numerical Solutions
In this section, we compute numerically the invariant distribution for empirically grounded
values of the parameters45 and π(w) = θ − w, motivated by our model in Appendix B.
Since π and, hence µ, are independent of c, any measure of markups provided is arbitrary
unless we provide a relation of c with the rest of the variables of the model. We assume
that θc is constant which is an implication of our analysis in Appendix B.
The left and right panel of Figure 2 show how the expected and standard deviations,
respectively, of the markup and the money left on the table, change with the severity of
the financial constraint.46
Figure 2 illustrates our first main result. The left panel quantifies our results in Corol-
lary 3(ii) in the context of our dynamic model. It shows that exogenous diﬀerences in
45Early work of Hong and Shum (2002) suggests that firms that do highway maintenance typically bid
in 4 contracts per year:“a data set of bids submitted in procurement contract auctions conducted by the
NJDOT in the years 1989-1997 [...] firms which are awarded at least one contract bid in an average of
29-43 auctions.” See also Porter and Zona (1993). Thus, we compute annual market shares for years of
four periods. We also choose β = 0.9602 so that the annual discount rate is 0.85, slightly higher than the
0.80 used in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), implying an annual expected cost of working capital of
0.15.
46It may be shown that one can obtain the graph corresponding to diﬀerent values of θc simply by
multiplying the values in the vertical axis in Figure 2 by θc .
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Figure 2: Expected and st. deviations of markup and money left on the table for θc = 1.
the severity of the financial constraint explain diﬀerences in markups and money left on
the table. The right panel shows that markups and money left on the table have signif-
icant volatility across auctions, for a given ratio θm , due to the endogenous volatility of
the firm’s working capital and cash. Note that, by continuity, Corollary 5(ii) implies that
uncertainty vanishes as the ratio θm approaches 4. Indeed, one can deduce from Lemma
5 in the Appendix that for any θm there is almost zero uncertainty for any reasonable
measure of uncertainty.
Finally, we illustrate our third main result in Figure 3.
Figure 3: HHI and invariant distribution of annual market shares (1 year= 4 periods)
The left panel shows how the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) changes with the
severity of the financial constraint. The firms internal financial decisions imply that con-
centration increases with the severity of the financial constraint. The right panel shows
that this eﬀect appears together with persistent asymmetries in market shares. It shows
that in the case of tight financial constraints the same firm wins all the annual procurement
contracts 98.92% of the years. On the contrary, in the case of a loose financial constraint
there is little concentration in that each firms wins at least 25% of the annual procurement
contracts in 87% of the years.
Similar conclusions can be derived with respect to the persistency of the leadership.
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Figure 4 shows how the probability of a leadership reversal after 22 years changes with
the severity of the financial constraint.47
Figure 4: Lower bound for the probability of no leadership reversal in 22 years.
Therefore, a typical time series of market shares displays not only a lot of concentration
but also, and more importantly, tipping as in Cabral (2011), i.e. the system is very
persistent but moves across extremely asymmetric states.
The above results explain our prediction of greater market concentration and asym-
metric market shares, together with occasional leadership reversals, for larger projects to
the extend that one can associate the severity of the financial constraint to the project’s
size, as we show in Appendix B.
We underscore that the concentration eﬀects discussed in this section arise even in the
absence of exogenous shocks unlike those obtained by Besanko and Doraszelski (2004),
and Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010).
5 Conclusions
We have studied a model of bidding markets with financial constraints. A key element of
our analysis is that the stage at which firms choose their working capitals resembles an all
pay auction with caps.
The above features, and thus our results, seem pertinent for other models of investing
under winner-take-all competition, like patent races. A natural extension should consider
47This time horizon allow the comparison of the predictions of our model with the stylized fact about
unchanging industry leadership highlighted by Besanko and Doraszelski (2004).
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alternative models of winner-take-all competition with financial constraints. Another in-
teresting extension is to allow for private information about costs. This is the natural
framework to test our model versus the standard one as it nest both of them. Existing
results for all pay auctions and general contests48 suggest these may be fruitful lines of
future research.
Finally, our analysis points out a tractable way to incorporate the dynamics of liquidity
in Galenianos and Kircher’s (2008) analysis of monetary policy.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let F˜ be the distribution function of the symmetric strategy. To see why the proposed
strategy is an equilibrium note that the expected payoﬀ of Firm i with cash mi when it
chooses working capital w and the other firm randomizes its working capital according to
F˜ is equal to:
mi − (1− β)w + βπ(w)F˜ (w),
which by definition of F˜ is equal to mi for any w ≤ νβ, and strictly less than mi otherwise,
as required.
As we argue in the text, we can restrict to strategies with support in [0, νβ]. We prove
two properties that any equilibrium (σ1,σ2) must verify. Later, we show that the proposed
strategy is the only one that verifies them. These two properties also hold true in the more
general case in which we do not restrict to m1,m2 ≥ νβ.
Claim 1: If w ∈ (0, νβ] belongs to the support of σi, then σj([w − ￿, w]) > 0 (j ￿= i) for
any ￿ > 0.
48Amann and Leininger (1996) study the relationship between the equilibrium of the all pay auction
with and without private information and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) study the similarities between the
equilibrium outcome in an all pay auction and in some other models of contests.
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In order to get a contradiction suppose that w ∈ (0, νβ] belongs to the support of
σi and σj([w − ￿, w]) = 0 for some ￿ > 0. We shall argue that Firm i has a profitable
deviation when Firm j plays σj . The contradiction hypothesis has two implications. (a)
w − ￿ gives Firm i strictly greater expected payoﬀs than w since the former saves on
the cost of working capital and increases the profit when winning without aﬀecting the
probability of winning. (b) Firm i’s expected payoﬀs are continuous in its working cap-
ital at w since σj does not put an atom at w. (a) and (b) means that there exists an
￿￿ ∈ (0, ￿) such that any working capital in (w− ￿￿, w+ ￿￿) gives strictly less expected pay-
oﬀs than a working capital w− ￿. The fact that w belongs to the support of σi means that
i puts strictly positive probability in (w−￿￿, w+￿￿) and thus there is a profitable deviation.
Claim 2: If there exists some w ∈ [0,min{νβ,mj}) such that σj([w − ￿, w]) > 0 for any
￿ > 0, then σi({w}) = 0 (i ￿= j).
By contradiction, suppose an w ∈ [0,min{νβ,mj}) for which σj([w − ￿, w]) > 0 for
any ￿ > 0 and σi({w}) > 0. For ￿￿ > 0 small enough, Firm j can improve by moving the
probability that its puts in [w − ￿￿, w], to a point slightly above w. This deviation aﬀects
marginally Firm j’s cost of working capital and profit conditional on winning but allows
the firm to win the procurement contract at a strictly positive profit if Firm i plays the
atom at w.
Claim 1 and 2 imply that (i) the only points where there can be a mass point in the
strategies is at zero or at νβ, (ii) at most one of the firms’ strategies can have an atom at
zero, and (iii) the support of both σ1 and σ2 must be the same and equal to an interval
[0, ν] for some ν > 0. Conditions (i)-(iii) and the usual indiﬀerence condition that must
hold in a mixed strategy equilibrium implies: (iv) that the distributions of each of the
firms, σ1 and σ2, is equal to a continuous solution of Equation (1) in (0, ν). Suppose, first,
that there is no atom at νβ. The uniqueness of the solution of our diﬀerential equation,
see Theorem 7.1 in Coddington and Levinson (1984), pag. 22, implies that there is only
one solution that passes by the point (ν, 1) for each ν ∈ [0, νβ]. Thus, both firms must use
in equilibrium the same distribution. This together with (iv) means that this distribution
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must be the solution to our diﬀerential equation with initial condition (0, 0). This is our
proposed distribution function. To conclude the proof we argue by contradiction that
there is no atom at νβ. Suppose there is an atom of probability γ > 0 in one of the
distributions. By (iv), this distribution must be a solution to our diﬀerential equation
that passes by (νβ, 1−γ). Since the solution with initial condition (0, 0) passes by (νβ, 1),
the uniqueness of the solutions of our diﬀerential equation implies that the solution that
passes by (νβ, 1− γ) must cross the horizontal axis strictly to the right of (0, 0) which is
a contradiction with (iv). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
We start showing that the proposed strategies are an equilibrium. Let ml be the laggard’s
cash and denote by F˜l and F˜L the laggard and the leader’s solutions, respectively. The
laggard’s expected payoﬀs of a working capital w ∈ [0,ml) when the leader plays F˜L are
equal to:
mi − (1− β)w + βπ(w)F˜L(w),
which is constant and equal to mi by definition of F˜L. Recall that our tie breaking
rule allocates the contract to the leader when both firms carry working capital ml which
guarantees that payoﬀs are continuous at w = ml, and hence equal to mi. Consequently,
the laggard has no incentive to deviate. Similarly, the leader’s expected payoﬀs of a
working capital w ∈ [0, x] when the laggard plays F˜l are equal to:
mi − (1− β)w + βπ(w)F˜l(w),
which, by definition of F˜l, is constant and equal to mi− (1− β)ml + βπ(ml) if w ∈ [0,ml]
and equal to mi− (1−β)w+βπ(w) < mi− (1−β)ml+βπ(ml) if w ∈ (ml, x]. Hence there
are no incentives to deviate. Note that we are using that our tie breaking rule allocates
the good to the leader when both firms choose zero working capital.
To prove that there is no other equilibrium, note that Claims 1 and 2 in the proof
of Proposition 1 also hold true here. They imply here that (i) the laggard’s strategy can
have a probability mass only at zero and the leader’s only at either zero or ml, (ii) at most
one of the firms’ strategies can have an atom at zero, and (iii) the support of both σ1 and
σ2 must be the same and equal to an interval [0, ν] for some ν ∈ [0,ml]. (i)-(iii) and the
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usual indiﬀerence condition that must hold in a mixed strategy equilibrium implies: (iv)
that the distributions of each of the firms, σ1 and σ2, is equal to a continuous solution of
Equation (1) in (0, ν). Since the solutions to Equation (1) do not cross in [0,ml] and the
solution with initial condition (0, 0) reaches one at νβ > ml, both firm’s strategies must
have atoms. (i) implies that the laggard’s atom is at zero and (ii) that the leader’s is at
ml. This together with (iv) imply our proposed strategies. ￿
Auxiliary Results of Section 4.2
Lemma 2. For any Ψˆ, Ψˆ￿ ∈ P,
(i) For any (x0, y0) ∈ [0, x]× [0, 1], there is a unique continuous solution to the diﬀeren-
tial equation (11) that passes by (x0, y0). All these solutions are locally increasing.
(ii) For any solution Fˆ to the diﬀerential equation (11) and w > w￿:
Fˆ (w)π(w)− Fˆ (w￿)π(w￿) ≤ 1− β
β
(w − w￿),
with equality if w,w￿ ∈ [θ −m,x].
(iii) νˆΨˆ ∈ [νβ, x].
(iv) Ψˆ￿ ≤ Ψˆ implies Fˆ (0, Ψˆ￿,m) ≤ Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m).
(v) Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m) is continuous and decreasing in m for y < m.
Proof. Note that Equation (2) can be written as:
Fˆ ￿(w) =
1−β
β + (−π￿(w))Fˆ (w)
π(w) + Ψˆ(w +m)
. (7)
The application of Theorem 7.1 in Coddington and Levinson (1984), pag. 22 to this ex-
pression implies the existence and uniqueness in (i). It also implies the continuity in (v).
The monotonicity with respect to x follows from the fact that the right hand side of the
above expression is strictly positive. The inequality of (ii) can be proved integrating both
sides of the following inequality implied by Equation (2):
Fˆ ￿(w)π(w) + Fˆ (w)π￿(w) ≤ 1− β
β
.
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The equality of (ii) follows because the above inequality holds with equality when w ∈
[θ −m,x] since Ψˆ(w +m) = 0. (iii) follows from the consequence of (i) that solutions are
increasing and do not cross and two facts: (a) a solution with final condition Fˆ (νβ) = 1
verifies that Fˆ (0) ≥ 0, and (b) a solution with final condition Fˆ (x) = 1 verifies that
Fˆ ((θ −m)+) = 0. (a) can be proved using that (ii) for w = νβ and w￿ = 0 implies that:
Fˆ (0) ≥ π(ν
β)− 1−ββ νβ
π(0)
,
and the definition of νβ, whereas (b) can be shown using that (ii) for w = x and w￿ =
(θ −m)+ implies that:
Fˆ ((θ −m)+) = π(x)−
1−β
β (x− (θ −m)+)
π((θ −m)+) ,
and the definition of x. (iv) uses that the right hand side of Equation (7) decreases when
we increase Ψˆ and hence at any crossing point between a solution associated to Ψˆ￿ and a
solution associated to Ψˆ the former has greater slope than the latter. Consequently the
former solution can cross the latter only once and from below which implies our result.
The monotonicity in (v) follows from the implication of (i) that the diﬀerent solutions are
increasing and do not cross. ￿
Lemma 3. Equation (3) has a solution in P that we denote by Ψβ.
Proof. Endow P with the sup-norm, that we denote by || · ||, and let T be an operator
defined by a function that maps to each function Ψˆ ∈ P a function equal to the right hand
side of Equation (3).
We prove the lemma showing that the operator T meets all the conditions required by
Schauder Fixed-Point Theorem, see Stokey and Lucas (1999), Theorem 17.4, page 520, in
the subset Pˆ ⊂ T of the functions Ψˆ such that Ψˆ(x) = 0.
Claim 1: T (Pˆ) ⊂ Pˆ. Lemma 2(v) implies that T (Ψˆ)(m) is continuous and decreasing
in m. By Lemma 2(iii) νˆΨˆ ≤ x and hence T (Ψˆ)(x) = 0. Finally, Ψˆ(m) ≤ βπ(0)1−β implies
that T (Ψˆ)(m) ≤ βFˆ (0, Ψˆ,m)π(0)1−β ≤ β1−βπ(0).
Claim 2: T is continuous. Take any convergent sequence {Ψˆn} ∈ Pˆ with limit
Ψˆ ∈ Pˆ. Let ￿n ≡ supn˜≥n ||Ψˆn˜ − Ψˆ||. Since Ψˆn → Ψˆ, {￿n} is a decreasing sequence
converging to zero. We use:
Ψn(m) ≡
￿
Ψˆ(m)− ￿n
￿+
.
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and,
Ψn(m) ≡ min
￿
Ψˆ(m) + ￿n,
β
1− βπ(0)
￿￿
1− (m− x)
+
θ − x
￿
,
By construction Ψn,Ψn ∈ P, Ψˆn(m) ∈ [Ψn(m),Ψn(m)], {Ψn} is an increasing sequence
and {Ψn} is a decreasing sequence, and Ψn and Ψn converge point-wise to Ψˆ. Thus,
{Fˆ (0,Ψn,m)} and {Fˆ (0,Ψn,m)} are increasing and decreasing, respectively sequences
of continuous functions (in m), by Lemma 2(iv)-(v). Both sequences converge pointwise
to Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m), by an adaptation of Theorem 7.1 in Coddington and Levinson (1984),
pag. 22.49 Thus, Theorem 7.13 in Rudin (1976), pag. 150, implies that the sequences of
functions {Fˆ (0,Ψn, ·)} and {Fˆ (0,Ψn, ·)} convergence in the sup-norm to F (0, Ψˆ, ·). This
implies the convergence of T Ψˆn to T Ψˆ since Fˆ (0, Ψˆn,m) ∈ [Fˆ (0,Ψn,m), Fˆ (0,Ψn,m)] by
Lemma 2(iv). This means that T is continuous as desired.
Claim 3: the family T (Pˆ) is equicontinuous. Since T (Ψˆ)(·) is decreasing, we shall
show that there exists κ > 0 such that for any m￿ < m and Ψˆ ∈ P, T (Ψˆ)(m￿)−T (Ψˆ)(m) ≤
κ(m − m￿). We start noting that T (Ψˆ)(m￿) − T (Ψˆ)(m) = 0 if m￿,m ≥ νˆΨˆ, and that
T (Ψˆ)(m￿)− T (Ψˆ)(m) = T (Ψˆ)(m￿)− T (Ψˆ)(νˆΨˆ) if m￿ ≤ νˆΨˆ ≤ m. Take now m,m￿ ≤ νˆΨˆ.
T (Ψˆ)(m￿)− T (Ψˆ)(m) = β(π(0) + Ψˆ(m))(Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m￿)− Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m))
≤ β
1− βπ(0)(Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m
￿)− Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m))
=
β
1− βπ(0)
￿
1−
￿ m￿
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m)
π(y) + Ψˆ(y +m)
dy
−
￿
1−
￿ m
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m￿)
π(y) + Ψˆ(y +m)
dy
￿￿
≤ β
1− βπ(0)
￿ m
m￿
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m)
π(y) + Ψˆ(y +m)
dy
≤ β
1− βπ(0)
1−β
β + γ
π(x)
(m−m￿),
49Just note that Theorem 7.1 in Coddington and Levinson (1984), pag. 22, implies that the solution to
the system of diﬀerential equations defined by:
Fˆ ￿(w) =
1−β
β +(−π￿(w))Fˆ (w)
π(w)+min
n
(Ψˆ(w+m)+ρ(w))+, β1−β π(0)
o„
1− (m−x)+θ−x
«
ρ￿(w) = 0,
with initial conditions Fˆ (x0) = y0 and ρ(x0) = ￿, is continuous in ￿.
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where we have used: in the first step, Equation (3); in the second step, that Ψˆ(m) ≤
β
1−βπ(0); in the third step, that Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m
￿) and Fˆ (0, Ψˆ,m) verify Equation (11) below
and that Fˆ (m￿, Ψˆ,m￿) = Fˆ (m, Ψˆ,m) = 1; in the fourth step, that Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m) ≤ Fˆ (y, Ψˆ,m￿)
by application of Lemma 2(v); and in the last step, that F (y, Ψˆ,m) ≤ 1, that Ψˆ(y+m) ≥ 0,
and that −π￿ is continuous and hence bounded above in [0, θ] by some γ ≥ 0 finite.
Hence, our κ is equal to β1−βπ(0)
1−β
β +γ
π(x) > 0 as desired. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
To show that our bid function b∗ maximizes the firm’s Bellman equation, we prove the more
general argument that for our continuation value W ∗, and for any given bid and working
capital of the rival, a working capital w and a bid b˜ > π(w)+c does strictly worse than the
same bid b˜ and the minimum working capital that makes this bid acceptable, i.e. w˜ such
that π(w˜)+c = b˜. The argument is the same as in the static case: reducing today’s working
capital while keeping constant the bid increases today’s utility in the amount of working
capital reduced while it decreases tomorrow’s continuation value in its discounted value.
This is easy to deduce from the functional form of W ∗ when the reduction in today’s
working capital (keeping constant the bid) does not change the identity of tomorrow’s
leader. Otherwise, the result follows from the fact that the premium of being leader
Ψβ(m￿) is equal to zero because the change in leadership can only occur when the other
firm’s cash is greater than θ. This is because the change does not aﬀect to the cash that
the other firm has and Assumption 1 implies that the cash of at least one firm must be
larger than θ.
Next, we assume our continuation value W ∗ and that both firms use b∗ and show that
a firm cannot do better than using σ∗ when the other firm uses σ∗. We start with the
symmetric scenario. In this case, the other firm’s randomization is equal to Fˆ (·,Ψβ, νβ),
which we write Fˇ to simplify the notation, and one can show after substituting the value
ofW ∗ and some algebra that the expected payoﬀs of choosing a working capital w ∈ [0,m]
are equal to:
m− (1− β)w + β
1− βm+ β
￿ min{w,νβ}
0
(π(w) +Ψβ(w˜ +m))Fˇ ￿(w˜)dw˜. (8)
The diﬀerential of this expression with respect to w is equal to zero for w ∈ [0, νβ] be-
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cause Fˇ verifies Equation (2), and negative for w > νβ. Thus, σ∗ is optimal because it
randomizes in the support [0, νβ].
In the laggard-leader scenario, the support of σ∗ is [0,m] but otherwise, the argument
is identical. In this case, we use that the expected payoﬀs of choosing a working capital
w ∈ [0,m] are equal to:
m− (1− β)w + β
1− βm+ β
￿ w
0
(π(w) +Ψβ(w˜ +m))(F βL,m)
￿(w˜)dw˜, (9)
if m < m￿, and to,
m− (1− β)w + β
1− βm+ βF
β
l,m(0)(π(w) +Ψ
β(m)))+
β
￿ min{w,m￿}
0
(π(w) +Ψβ(w˜ +m))(F βl,m)
￿(w˜)dw˜, (10)
if m > m￿. Note that although ties could occur with positive probability the tie breaking
rule always allocates the contract to the leader.
Finally, to show thatW ∗ is the value of our Bellman equation, note that the indiﬀerence
condition discussed above and the fact that W ∗ is equal to each of the Equations (8)-(10)
evaluated at w = 0. ￿
Auxiliary Results Used in the Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof of Theorem 1, we use that the solutions Fˆ to Equation (2) verify:
Fˆ (w)− Fˆ (w￿) =
￿ w
w￿
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))Fˆ (y)
π(y) +Ψ(y +m)
dy, (11)
for w ≥ w￿. We also use that:
Qβ(m, [0, x]) = F βl,m(x−m) + F βL,m(x−m)− F βl,m(x−m)F βL,m(x−m), (12)
that:
Qβ(θ, [0, x]) = F βL,θ(x−m)(2− F βL,θ(x−m)), (13)
since F βl,θ = F
β
L,θ, and the following lemmae.
Lemma 4.
(i) For any m ≥ νβ and w ∈ [0, x]:
F βl,m(w) = F
β
L,m(w) ≤
(1− β)w
βπ(w)
.
31
(ii) For any m < νβ, and w ∈ [0,m):
F βL,m(w) ≤
(1− β)w
βπ(w)
and F βl,m(w) ≥
π(m)− 1−ββ (m− w)
π(w)
,
with equality if w ≥ θ −m.
(iii) limβ→1 νβ = θ.
Proof. Lemma 2(ii) together with F βl,m(0) = F
β
L,m(0) = 0 for m ≥ νβ, and F βl,m(m) = 1
F βL,m(0) = 0 for m < ν
β imply, respectively, (i) and (ii). To prove the last item we use
Lemma 2(iii) and that limβ→1 νβ = θ, and that x ≤ θ. ￿
Lemma 5. Suppose limβ→1Ψβ(m) =∞.
• If θ > 2m then:
limβ→1 F βl,m(w) =

1 if m < θ −m and w ∈ [0,m]
π(m)
π(w) if m ∈ [θ −m, θ) and w ∈ [θ −m,m]
π(m)
π(θ−m) if m ∈ [θ −m, θ) and w ∈ [0, θ −m),
0 if m ≥ θ and w ∈ [0, θ),
limβ→1 F βL,m(w) =
 1 if w ≥ min{m, θ}0 if w < min{m, θ}.
• If θ ≥ 3m then:
lim
β→1
(1− β)Ψβ(m) =
 π(m) if m < θ −mπ(m) π(m)π(θ−m) if m ∈ [θ −m, θ).
Proof. Along this proof, we use that Ψβ(m), for m < θ, also diverges to infinity. This is
because: Ψβ(m) =
Fβl,m(0)
Fβl,m(0)
Ψβ(m) by Equation (3); F βl,m(0) ≤ 1; F βl,m(0) ≥
π(m)− 1−ββ m
π(0) for
m < νβ by Lemma 4(ii); and Lemma 4(iii).
Now, note that F βl,m(m) = 1 for m ≤ νβ which together with Equation (11) means
that:
F βl,m(w) = 1−
￿ m
w
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))F βl,m(y)
π(y) +Ψβ(y +m)
dy, if m ≤ νβ and w ∈ [0,m].
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Taking the limit50 β → 1 we get our result for m < θ − m and w ∈ [0,m] since the
numerator is bounded and the denominator diverges.
The limit of F βl,m when m ∈ [θ −m, θ) and w ∈ [θ −m,m] follows directly from the
fact that F βl,m(m) = 1 for m ≤ νβ and Lemma 4 (ii) and (iii).
This last result and the implication of Equation (11) that,
F βl,m(w) = F
β
l,m(θ−m)−
￿ θ−m
w
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))F βl,m(y)
π(y) +Ψβ(y +m)
dy, if m ∈ [θ−m, νβ) and w < θ−m
implies our result for m ∈ [θ − m, θ) and w ∈ [0, θ − m) taking the limit β → 1 and
applying Lemma 4 (iii).
The remaining limits in the first item can be easily derived from Lemma 4.
We start the proof of the limit in the second item for the case m = m. In this case,
we have to show that limβ→1(1− β)Ψβ(m) = π(m). Equation (3) implies:
(1−β)Ψβ(m) = βF βl,m(0)(π(0)+Ψβ(m))−βΨβ(m) = βF βl,m(0)π(0)−βΨβ(m)(1−F βl,m(0)),
where the first term in the last expression tends to π(0) by application of the result in the
first line of this lemma, and the last term is equal to:
βΨβ(m)
￿ m
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))F βl,m(y)
π(y) +Ψβ(y +m)
dy = β
￿ m
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))F βl,m(y)
π(y)
Ψβ(m)
+
Fβl,y+m(0)
Fβl,m(0)
dy.
where we have used in the last equality the implication of Equation (3) that Ψ
β(y+m)
Ψβ(m)
=
Fβl,y+m(0)
Fβl,m(0)
. The limit of this last term when β tends to one is equal to π(0) − π(m), as
required, since Ψβ(m) diverges to infinity and, as we showed above, F βl,m(w) tends to one
for w ≤ m < θ −m and the lemma assumes that 2m < θ −m.
The result for a general m follows from the implication of Equation (3) that Ψ
β(m)
Ψβ(m)
=
Fβl,m(0)
Fβl,m(0)
and the limit results for F βl,m in this lemma. ￿
Lemma 6. If limβ→1Ψβ(m) =∞ and θ > 2m, then limβ→1 µβ((m, θ]) = 0.
Proof. The result can be deduced from the application of Equation (6) noting that,
Qβ(m, (m, θ]) = Qβ(m, [m, θ])−Qβ(m, {m})
50Here, and in what follows, we compute the limit of integrals applying, without mentioning it explicitly,
the bounded convergence theorem (see Royden (1988), page 81).
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and that the right hand side converges to zero for any m ∈ [m, θ +m] as can be deduced
from Equation (12) and Lemma 5. ￿
Proof of Theorem 1
For ￿ > 0 and suﬃciently small, we define the following sets A ≡ {m}, B ≡ (m, θ−2m−￿],
C = (θ − 2m− ￿, θ −m− ￿), D ≡ [θ −m− ￿, θ − ￿), E ≡ [θ − ￿, θ +m].
Lemma 6 implies that it is suﬃcient to show that limβ→1 µβ(E) = 0.
Note that since Q(m,E) > 0 only if m ∈ D ∪ E:
µβ(E) = µβ(D)
￿
D
Qβ(m,E)
µβ(dm)
µβ(D)
+ µβ(E)
￿
E
Qβ(m,E)
µβ(dm)
µβ(E)
≤ µβ(D) +
￿
µβ(E)
￿
E
Qβ(m,E)
µβ(dm)
µβ(E)
￿
.
Besides since Q(m,D) > 0 only if m ∈ C ∪D ∪ E:,
µβ(D) = µβ(C ∪D)
￿
C∪D
Qβ(m,D)
µβ(dm)
µβ(C ∪D) + µ
β(E)
￿
E
Qβ(m,D)
µβ(dm)
µβ(E)
.
Substituting the latter equality in the former, using that 1 − Qβ(m,D) − Qβ(m,E) =
Qβ(m,A ∪B ∪ C) and solving for µβ(E), one gets:
µβ(E) ≤
µβ(C ∪D) ￿C∪DQβ(m,D) µβ(dm)µβ(C∪D)￿
E Q
β(m,A ∪B ∪ C)µβ(dm)
µβ(E)
≤
µβ(C ∪D) ￿C∪DQβ(m,D) µβ(dm)µβ(C∪D)
Qβ(θ, A ∪B ∪ C) ,
(14)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Qβ(m, [0, x]) is increasing in F βl,m(x)
and F βL,m(x) and that each of these two functions is greater than F
β
l,θ(x) and F
β
L,θ(x),
respectively for all x. This last property follows from the definition of F βl,m and F
β
L,m and
in the case of Fl,m the monotonicity in Lemma 2(v).
We shall show that the right hand side of Equation (14) tends to zero as β tends to 1.
We first argue that:
lim
β→1
Qβ(θ, A ∪B ∪ C)
(1− β)2 = 2 limβ→1
F βL,θ(θ − 2m− ￿)
(1− β)2
= 2 lim
β→1
￿ θ−2m−￿
0
1
β + (−π￿(y))
FβL,θ(y)
1−β
(1− β)π(y) + (1− β)Ψβ(y +m)dy
= 2
￿ θ−2m−￿
0
1
π(m)
dy > 0,
34
where we have used in the first step, Equation (13) and that limβ→1 F βL,θ(θ− 2m− ￿) = 0
by Lemma 5; we have used in the second step, Equation (11) and F βL,θ(0) = 0; and we
have used in the third step Lemma 5 and that for any y < min{θ −m,m}:
lim
β→1
F βL,m(y)
1− β = limβ→1
￿ y
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(z))F βL,m(z)
(1− β)π(z) + (1− β)Ψβ(z +m)dz = 0, (15)
that can be deduced from Lemma 5.
Next, we show that for any m < θ (and hence any m ∈ C ∪D):
lim
β→1
Qβ(m,D)
1− β = limβ→1
F βl,m(θ −m− ￿)− F βl,m(θ − 2m− ￿)
(1− β)
= lim
β→1
￿ min{m,θ−m−￿}
min{m,θ−2m−￿}
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))F βl,m(y)
(1− β)π(y) + (1− β)Ψβ(y +m)dy
≤
￿ min{m,θ−m−￿}
min{m,θ−2m−￿}
−π￿(y)
π(m)min
￿
1, π(y+m)π(θ−m)
￿dy <∞,
where we use in the first equality that,
lim
β→1
Qβ(m, [m,x])
1− β = limβ→1
Fl,m(x−m)
1− β
if x < θ because either x−m ≥ m and then Qβ(m, [m,x]) = 1 = Fl,m(x−m) or x−m < m
and then we can use equations (12) and (15); we use in the second equality, Equation (11);
and we use in the inequality Lemma 5 and F βl,m(y) ≤ 1.
We conclude the proof by showing that limβ→1 µ
β(C∪D)
1−β = 0. To prove so, note that
since Q(m,C ∪ D) = 0 if m < m∗ ≡ θ − 3m − ￿ and Qβ(m, [0, x]) = Qβ(θ, [0, x]) if
m ∈ [θ, θ +m]:
µβ(C ∪D)
1− β =
￿ θ
m∗
Qβ(m,C ∪D)
1− β
µβ(dm)
µβ((m∗, θ))
µβ((m∗, θ)) +
Qβ(θ, C ∪D)
1− β µ
β([θ, θ +m]),
The first term in the sum goes to zero because Qβ(m,C ∪D) ≤ Qβ(m,D) and m∗ > m
and we have already shown that limβ→1 Q
β(m,D)
1−β <∞ if m < θ and limβ→1 µβ((m, θ)) = 0.
That the second term also goes to zero can be deduced from equations (13) and (15) and
the fact that µβ([θ, θ +m]) ≤ 1. ￿
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The lemma follows from the following sequence of inequalities, that start from a
transformation of Equation (3), taking the limit β → 1:
(1− β)Ψβ(m) = βFl,m(0)
￿
π(0) +Ψβ(m)
￿
− βΨβ(m)
= βFl,m(0)
￿
π(0)− 1− Fl,m(0)
Fl,m(0)
Ψβ(m)
￿
≥ βFl,m(0)
￿
π(0)−
1−β
β m+ π(0)− π(m)
Fl,2m(0)
￿
≥ βFl,m(0)π(0)
π(2m) + π(m)− π(0)− 1−ββ 3m
π(2m)− 1−ββ 2m
,
where we have used in the first inequality that,
1− Fl,m(0) =
￿ m
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))Fl,m(y)
π(y) +Ψβ(y +m)
dy
≤
￿ m
0
1−β
β + (−π￿(y))
Ψβ(2m)
dy
=
1−β
β m+ π(0)− π(m)
Ψβ(2m)
and that by Equation (3) Ψ
β(m)
Ψβ(2m)
= Fl,m(0)Fl,2m(0) , and in the second inequality Lemma 4 (ii)
and (iii), since 2m < θ. This last inequality is implied by π(2m) > π(0)− π(m) ≥ 0. ￿
B A Model of Financial Constraints
In this Appendix, we endogenize the function π in a model in which moral hazard and
limited liability restrict the set of bids for which the firm can secure financing, i.e. the
set of acceptable bids. In this model, the firm can borrow from a competitive banking
sector but upon winning the procurement contract can divert a fraction of their total
available funds at the cost of jeopardizing the success of the procurement contract. The
main implication is that the minimum acceptable bid for a firm with working capital w is
given by a function π(w) ≡ θ − w, for some θ endogenously determined. Our analysis is
for the case of the dynamic model of Section 4 although it it straightforward how to adapt
it to the static model of Section 3.
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We say that the bid of a firm has secured financing if either the firm’s working capital
w is larger than the cost of the procurement contract c or the firm can borrow the required
funds c−w to pay the cost of the procurement contract c. In the latter case, the necessary
funds are provided by a competitive banking sector. We assume that the bank transfers
the funds after the firm has won the contract. At that point, the firm can either: (a) use
the total funds c, working capital plus bank lending, to pay the cost of the procurement
contract and comply with the procurement contract and with the bank; or (b) divert
an exogenously given fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of its total funds and comply neither with the
procurement contract nor with the bank. In case (a), the firm’s cash next period is equal to
the sum of its working capital w, its potential profits Π, i.e. the revenue of the procurement
contract minus its cost c, and the exogenous cash-flow m, minus any net payment to the
bank R. In case (b), limited liability implies that the firm gets expropriated of all non-
diverted funds and starts the next period with cash equal to its diverted funds αc plus the
exogenous cash-flow m.
One consequence is that a firm with continuation value strictly increasing in its cash
diverts funds if w+Π−R < αc. This means that a bank that lends to a firm that diverts
funds makes losses since its profits are equal to at most (1− α)c− (c− w) < 0, assuming
no discounting between the moment in which the bank lends the funds and when it is
paid back. Hence, banks do not lend to firms expected to divert funds, bank lending is
risk free, and as a consequence banks charge a zero net interest rate and only lend if the
potential profits of the firm are larger than αc−w. Therefore (and no proof is required):
Proposition 4. Only bids with potential profits larger than αc − w are acceptable for a
firm with working capital w. Hence, π(w) = αc− w, and θ = αc.
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